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The world of the very small is a quantum world, and that must be as true of
space and time and gravity as of electrons and photons and quarks.
John Wheeler
[H]istorical case studies can be too much like the Bible ... if one looks hard
enough, one can find an isolated instance that confirms or disconfirms almost
any claim.
Thomas Nickles
Science is what scientists have done, not what a philosopher tells us the
scientist meant to do, were really doing, or should have done.
James Cushing
1
PEEKING INSIDE THE BLACK BOX
To paraphrase Otto von Bismarck, as far as most philosophers are concerned, sci-
entific theories are like sausages: it is better not to see them being made! Standard
practice amongst philosophers of science is to investigate the finished products of
science: the theories that emerge from the scientific process. However, as Kuhn
taught us, the finished product, as presented in textbooks for example (usually
providing the ‘raw data’ for philosophers’ investigations), usually bears no trace
of what is often a highly non-trivial path towards victory—though often for good
pedagogical reasons.1 What philosophers play with are so many black boxes. Un-
til fairly recently they only focused on a handful of such black boxes, often from
1Note that I certainly don’t mean to disparage the textbook genre. Textbooks are significant in very
many ways, beyond the merely pedagogical; and qua historical objects, they are as interesting as any
other such objects. The textbooks one learns from can forge social identity and define a community. In
the context of quantum gravity research they are especially interesting because the arrival of a textbook
signals a certain degree of ‘maturity’ of the field. Only relatively recently have textbooks on quantum
gravity begun to appear. See the chapters in Part III of [59] for more on this fascinating topic.
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physics alone.2 However, they have expanded their horizons to include a broader
range of physical theories, and even theories from the social and biomedical sci-
ences. Still, most individual accounts of how science works focus on a small
selection of scientific theories, and ignore the historical and sociological details
behind their construction and their evaluation.
This situation clearly falls way short of an integration of history and philosophy.
While it is true that for some philosophical purposes this is as fine a grain of detail
as one needs3, if we are considering methodological issues, a black box approach
cannot be sufficient: we need to probe inside to see what factors accounted for
the success of some theory (or failure of another), and whether, in hindsight, they
were good ones and/or the only ones. As James Cushing and others have so ably
demonstrated, there is in fact often an enormous amount of contingency in theory-
selection, and what appeared to be ‘the only theory for the job’ was really only
one amongst several (quite distinct, yet empirically adequate) possibilities. Given
such contingency, a variety of non-epistemic factors can enter into the analysis,
supposedly leading to the additional input of psychology and sociology. It is pre-
cisely this intrusion that so offends philosophers of science—or at least those who
cling to the distinction between the contexts of discovery and of justification: yes,
social/psychological factors can enter into science weakly, in the discovery phase,
but they should never spill over into the justificatory phase.
Though, superficially, philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science share
the same object of investigation, there are, of course, many subtle (and not so sub-
tle) differences. Chief amongst these differences is the fact that philosophers of
science, inasmuch as they think about it at all, usually wish to use historical and
sociological data to inform a general theory of science, or at least some explana-
tory thesis about the way science works—they ever seek grist for their mills.4
Hence, their interest in history and sociology tends to be indirect, concerned with
2For example, Newtonian physics, general relativity (very minimally construed: i.e. tending to fo-
cus on the ‘famous’ light-bending experiment), and astronomy. Or else, various classic ‘dead’ theories,
such as phlogiston and the geocentric view. (Note, this black box analogy was traced, by Trevor Pinch,
back to his supervisor, Richard Whitley—see [73], p. 488.)
3Philosophers of physics, for example, often need only inspect the formal representation of a theory
and consider its space of possible interpretations. For this, one usually does not need to know the
intimate historical details of the theory’s construction, though even here I would have grave doubts
about the quality of such a wholly ahistorical approach. For example, it was his deep knowledge of the
historical complexities of general relativity that led John Stachel to uncover the hole argument, surely
one of the most important arguments in contemporary philosophy of spacetime physics.
4As Richard Burian puts it, “[w]hen philosophers turn to particular historical materials or case stud-
ies, they often begin with pre-established concepts and sometimes with expected conclusions in mind
... [and the] concepts employed often contain presuppositions about the nature of theory, evidence,
and explanation, about the relation of experiment to theory, the objectivity and intellectual autonomy
of scientific work, and the like” ([11], p. 398). Case studies can, of course, be useful for exploratory
purposes (as they are in the social sciences for example). However, unless one performs an analysis
of a sufficiently large sample of scientific theories (preferably chosen at random), the evidence they
confer on some general theory of science is rather weak. (I might add that changing the terminology
from “case studies” to “episodes” will not improve the quality vis-a`-vis evidence for methodological
theories.)
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their utility (in the form of degree of support) rather than their intrinsic worth.
Historians and sociologists tend to favour a more descriptive (and they might say,
objective) approach; wishing to describe as faithfully as possible, present and pre-
conceptions to one side, some scientific episode.5 They will trawl a wide variety
of sources in order to piece together an image of what happened—albeit an imper-
fect image, as they will acknowledge, tainted with various biases. They like to see
what goes in to the sausage machine, and observe how it works, rather than just
focusing on what comes out at the other end.
These professional differences can lead to some animosity between the various
disciplines, and any ‘integrative’ approach to philosophy of science will have to
try to balance these differences in outlook. Finally, it has to be said that when
philosophers do employ history, it is often bad (or lazy) history (cf. [72]), for
example, failing to take proper account of the different modes of presentation of
a theory (and its manner of construction and justification) depending on the in-
tended audience—journals, notebooks, interviews, textbooks, and public lectures
can reveal an enormous disparity despite sharing common subject matter. Whether
philosophers buy into sociological elements deep within science or not, this feature
of tailoring a description to an intended audience simply cannot be doubted. As I
indicated above, philosophers usually refer to textbooks. But textbooks are just as
bespoke as any other public account. For the historian, ‘primary sources’ (espe-
cially original notebooks and correspondence) weigh especially heavily in terms
of understanding theory construction and justification—cf [53]. For sociologists,
it is the actual practice of science (as it unfolds) that is most revealing.
How do we encourage and enable philosophers to look inside the black box
of science? How do we persuade them to look beyond the slender ‘internal’ (or
rationally reconstructed) histories that they favour? The strong programme advo-
cates a perfectly symmetrical treatment of ‘true’ (or ‘good’ or ‘selected’) science
and ‘false’ (or ‘bad’ or ‘rejected’) science. In practice, this is rather difficult to
achieve in an objective fashion because of the spectre of the way history actually
unfolded!6 However, the most trouble-free way to achieve what this so-called sym-
metry postulate set out to achieve, is to probe what Bruno Latour labeled ‘science
in action’: situations in which the truth values of the theories aren’t yet settled. In
a sense, such cases render the symmetry postulate redundant, for there is no fact of
the matter and so no broken symmetry in need of repair. Unfortunately, there aren’t
many philosophically interesting (that is, interesting to philosophers) situations of
this sort, and the examples that have been conducted have tended to be of a some-
what mundane character, often involving the discovery of some substance (such
5As von Humboldt famously (though, from our present temporal location, somewhat naively) put
it: “The historian’s task is to present what actually happened. The more purely and completely he
achieves this, the more perfectly has he solved his problem” ([54], p. 57).
6The strong programme is also just as problematically generalist as the standard philosophers’ ac-
counts: we need evidence to convince us that some family of once competing theories were indeed
equally viable before consensus was reached. This might well be true of some episodes but not in
others.
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as a particular vaccine) rather than the construction of a theory. Philosophers, for
better or for worse (though this is changing somewhat), tend to be attracted by the
bright lights of revolutionary episodes in science and especially by overarching,
universal, fundamental theories.
However, quantum gravity research offers exactly a such a situation, where the
symmetry between the various competing approaches appears not yet to have been
broken and in which we have an example of a revolution, albeit a revolution in
process.7 Moreover, it directly involves theory construction, and fundamental the-
ory construction at that. Indeed, it is widely believed to be the greatest unresolved
problem in fundamental physics. Despite over 80 years of hard labour, by the finest
physicists, all agreed on the importance of the problem posed by quantum gravity,
there is still no finished product to speak of: no culminating theory packaged in
a neat black box that philosophers of science can utilise without worrying about
its complex historical trajectory. Or, to return to my earlier metaphor: there’s no
sausage to speak of; it’s still in the machine!
Quantum gravity research is all the more enticing from the point of view of (in-
tegrated) history and philosophy of science [&HPS] since (for reasons to be dis-
cussed more fully below) it is not principally guided by the standard methodologi-
cal devices of empirical testing via experiments, novel predictions, or observations.
Yet one can still find all of the evaluative moves (selections and rejections) ordi-
narily seen in ‘run of the mill’ scientific endeavours: theories of quantum gravity
have come and gone despite being experimentally inaccessible. If not the standard
methodological virtues, what is guiding theory construction and selection in this
case?
In this chapter I aim to answer this question, but more generally I aim to to
highlight the ways in which quantum gravity research provides an excellent exam-
ple for &HPS. It enforces a ‘mixed methods’ approach since it involves a situation
with no definitive theory coupled with an awful lot of nontrivial history containing
several important theoretical casualties, despite the absence of direct experimental
support.8 This points quite naturally to a greater consideration of ‘external’ fac-
7Schweber defines Whiggish history as “the writing of history with the final, culminating event
or set of events in focus, with all prior events selected and polarized so as to lead to that climax”
([2], p. 41). While I am not strongly anti-Whiggish (I don’t see that the whiff of the present can
ever sensibly be eradicated from historical studies), evidently, since quantum gravity is still under
construction, there is no definitive ‘endpoint’ towards which Whiggish histories can retrospectively
chart the progression of the theory—though one can envisage the possibility of ‘local’ Whiggism,
involving smaller historical steps. Moreover, the ‘justification/discovery’ distinction (the central culprit
behind the disconnect between history of science and philosophy of science) looks far more flimsy in
the context of quantum gravity research since the circumstances surround the construction of the theory
(such the desire to have universal theories that do not have limitations of scale) become the very mode
of justification. That is, a successful theory (i.e. successful to the extent that it ought to be pursued) is
simply one that meets this desire in a consistent way.
8The historical nature of quantum gravity will also please those historians who bemoan the trend
towards specialization. It has almost a century of development with no closure. Quantum gravity
is a distinctively international field of research; it incorporates elements from a very wide variety of
theories, and many branches of mathematics. It has witnessed both military and industrial support,
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tors (if we must persist with this notion) controlling theory evaluation. Hence, we
have a natural convergence of history, philosophy, and sociology. I submit that a
study of quantum gravity along any one of these lines (philosophical, historical,
sociological) will inevitably soon find itself incorporating the others.
Let me nail my colours firmly to the mast regarding matters methodological:
I advocate a view broadly similar to that espoused by James Cushing (himself
borrowing crucial ideas from Arthur Fine), according to which history is of vital
importance to philosophical theses, but if one looks sufficiently closely at a wide
enough sample of historical episodes in science one very quickly sees that there
is no one size fits all scheme: even methodology can change if the context so de-
mands it. The process of constructing and evaluating scientific theories, much like
an economic time-series, is distinctly non-stationary. Just when it seems to be act-
ing according to some pattern, the pattern shifts. We find this to be especially true
in the case of quantum gravity research.9 The methodological lessons of quantum
gravity do not stop there: quantum gravity research is important too in our primary
theories; namely, the standard model of particle physics and classical general rel-
ativity (both of which inform the standard model of cosmology). These theories
would look very different were it not for the impact of quantum gravity research
and the concepts and tools it has generated—indeed, this external utility has been
adopted at various times to support continued research on quantum gravity.
I begin with a brief description of some peculiarities of historical research on
quantum gravity, introducing the basic idea of the problem of quantum gravity by
way of its beginnings. I then describe the problem of quantum gravity in more
detail, focusing on the energy, length, and mass scales that characterise it, and
consider the role that these scales played in early work. I then go on to introduce a
variety of the main ways of proceeding with respect to the problem in these early
days. My focus throughout is on the early history, pre-1960s, since beyond this the
entanglement with cosmology significantly complicates matters (but see Kaiser
[56; 57; 58] for some interesting work on the entanglement of classical general
in addition to standard university-based support. More recently it has begun to utilise cosmology,
computer simulation, condensed mater physics, and the new range of particle accelerators. A historian
would be hard pressed to give a local account of quantum gravity.
9Quantum gravity might look unappealing for those philosophers steeped in ‘the new experimental-
ism’, for, prima facie, there simply are no experiments to analyse! However, recent work in quantum
gravity attempts to make contact with experiments (using astrophysical data and the LHC, for exam-
ple), though so far without success. The reasons behind the lack of success is interesting in itself. But
even the early work which lacked experiments simpliciter is interesting from the point of view of how
scientists go about evaluating their theories when so important a resource as experiment is unavailable.
Thought experiments play a more important role (I will discuss below a foundational one, associated
with Bohr and Rosenfeld’s analysis of measurability of quantum fields). But also, theoretical predic-
tions of the ingredient theories of quantum gravity (i.e. general relativity and quantum field theory)
are used as (proxy) experimental data points for quantum gravity research. Most notably, perhaps, is
the computation of the black hole entropy formula, that any approach worth its salt must be able to
derive—Eric Curiel [14] has argued that this kind of usage of still-unconfirmed claims as evidence (if
an approach is able to reproduce it) is illegitimate (here stemming from the semiclassical theory involv-
ing quantum fields on a classical, black hole background). However, the illegitimacy depends on what
one views as the ‘laws of scientific development’.
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relativity and elementary particle physics), as does the emergence of string theory
(on which, see: [78]). Finally, I consider, rather more directly, the implications of
the development of quantum gravity research for &HPS.10
2
ONE REVOLUTION TOO FEW?
In 1940 Einstein wrote the following words:
The development during the present century is characterized by two
theoretical systems essentially independent of each other: the theory
of relativity and the quantum theory. The two systems do not directly
contradict each other; but they seem little adapted to fusion into one
unified theory. [...] [T]his theory, like the earlier field theories, has
not up till now supplied an explanation of the atomistic structure of
matter. This failure has probably some connection with the fact that
so far it has contributed nothing to the understanding of quantum phe-
nomena. To take in these phenomena, physicists have been driven
to the adoption of entirely new method. [...] [T]he quantum theory
of to-day differs fundamentally from all previous theories of physics,
mechanistic as well as field theories. Instead of a model description
of actual space-time events, it gives the probability distributions for
possible measurements as functions of time. [...] All attempts to rep-
resent the particle and wave features displayed in the phenomena of
light and matter, by direct course to a space-time model, have so far
ended in failure. [...] For the time being, we have to admit that we
do not possess any general theoretical basis for physics, which can be
regarded as its logical foundation. [.] Some physicists, among them
myself, can not believe that we must abandon, actually and forever,
the idea of direct representation of physical reality in space and time;
or that we must accept the view that events in nature are analogous to
a game of chance. ([36], pp. 489–492)
It is a little curious that so many great revolutionary episodes happened almost
simultaneously at the beginning of the twentieth century. Perhaps one revolution
made it easier for others to follow, via some kind of snowball effect? Whatever the
reason, the revolution that resulted in general relativity and the revolution that re-
sulted in quantum theory were close neighbours in time. Einstein was profoundly
involved in the creation of both theoretical frameworks, though the former more
so than the latter. At the time of the construction of the general theory of rel-
ativity he firmly believed in the existence of quanta of radiation. But this only
involved a belief in the property of discreteness (with no real sense of ontological
10I am indebted to the brief review of the early history of quantum gravity by John Stachel: [93].
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substrate beyond this), rather than belief in what would become quantum mechan-
ics (or quantum field theory—though here too his contributions on emission and
absorption of radiation proved crucial). Most physicists believe another revolution
is required to bring quantum theory and general relativity—cf. [83].
Since such quanta, with their discrete energies and other properties, would in-
evitably couple to the gravitational field (in however small a way, the gravitational
interaction being universal), Einstein couldn’t ignore the fact that something would
need to be said about the nature of this interaction.11 Indeed, almost as soon as
general relativity was completed, Einstein became aware of a possible conflict be-
tween it (or, more specifically, the existence of gravitational waves) and the princi-
ples of quantum theory12, and, therefore, the need for a quantum theory of gravity.
Thus, he writes that
[A]s a result of the internal-atomic movement of electrons, atoms must radiate not only electromagnetic
but also gravitational energy, if only in minuscule amounts. Since this cannot be the case in nature, then
it appears that the quantum theory must modify not only Maxwellian electrodynamics but also the new
theory of gravitation ([33], p. 696).13
In this case Einstein is clearly troubled by the potential clash between the theoret-
ically predicted gravitational radiation combined with the empirically observable
stability of atoms: any moving mass (even the electrons in atoms) will radiate grav-
itational energy. In other words, something like Planck’s law of radiation would
have to be found for gravitation in order to account for the stability. He repeated
this claim again in 1918, stating that “an improved version of quantum theory
would lead to changes in the gravitational theory” ([34], p. 167).14
11A little later it would also come to be understood that there is a ‘formal interaction’ between general
relativity and quantum objects stemming from the peculiar nature of fermions: including objects with
half-integer spins imposes a variety of constraints on the spacetime structure, and therefore on the
gravitational field (resulting in a slightly modified theory of gravitation). This was a rather slow lesson.
12As Kragh has pointed out, the version of quantum theory that Einstein would have been thinking
about at this early phase of general relativity’s development was the Bohr-Sommerfeld theory—see
[64], p. 965. Einstein would have been particularly impressed with the way the Sommerfeld theory
integrated (special) relativity and quantum theory. Helmut Rechenberg claims (though doesn’t provide
a source) that Sommerfeld published his results after Einstein informed him that the general relativity
would not modify the results in any appreciable way ([76], p. 160).
13“Gleichwohl mu¨ssten die Atome zufolge der inneratomischen Elektron-enbewegung night nur
electromagnetische, sondern auch Gravitations-energie ausstrahlen, wenn auch in winzigem Betrage.
Da dies in Wahrheit in der Natur nicht zutreffen du¨rfte, so scheint es, dass die Quantentheorie nicht
nur die Maxwellsche Elektrodynamik, sondern auch die neue Gravitationstheorie wird modifizieren
mu¨ssen.”
14By 1919 he was already going down the path of unitary field theories that would mark much of
his later work: “there are reasons for thinking that the elementary formations which go to make up
the atom are held together by gravitational forces” ([35], p. 191). As Stachel notes ([93], p. 526),
this marks a reversal in the priority given to the two theories, general relativity and quantum theory.
Whereas prior to 1919 he believed that the latter might lead to modifications in the former; here general
relativity (coupled with the electromagnetic field) is now being used to explain the quantum structure
of matter. We can surmise that it was as a result of the work by others on general relativity and
its unification with electromagnetism. Max Born writes that Einstein, up until 1920, was still very
concerned with the relation between quantum and relativity. Einstein wrote him: “I always brood in
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This looks like a potential empirical motivation for pursuing quantum grav-
ity. However, as Gorelik correctly points out, whilst atomic radiation (computed
along the lines of Maxwell’s theory) leads to the collapse of the atom in (order of)
10−10 seconds (a fact inconsistent with observations), atomic gravitational radia-
tion, computed using Einstein’s formula, has a collapse time of the order of 1037
seconds. Therefore, there would in fact be no empirical inconsistency as a result
of gravitational radiation and we should not be puzzled by the stability of atoms in
this case.
Gorelik ([44], p. 365) argues that an “analogy with electrodynamics” lay behind
this comment of Einstein’s. This analogy was a persistent feature of early research
on quantum gravity—see below. One must also bear in mind that the issue of
absorption and emission of radiation must have occupied a central place in his
thinking at the time of writing, for his paper on the emission and absorption of
radiation in quantum theory appeared very shortly afterwards—replete with the
statement that “it seems no longer doubtful that the basic idea of quantum theory
must be maintained”. What is remarkable, given what we know of the certainty he
professed about general relativity, is that he openly considered the possibility that
the quantum theory would demand some kind of ‘modification’ (what we would
now refer to as a quantum correction) of general relativity!15
However, similar claims were made intermittently over the next decade or so,
though nothing amounting to a serious attempt to construct a full-blown quantum
theory of gravity was undertaken. These claims were primarily from German (or
German speaking) physicists. For example, as early as 1919, Arthur von Haas
writes (on the basis of ‘unification’ ideals) that:
Arguably, one of the most important future tasks of the axiomaization of physics is the implementation
of quantum theory in the system of the general theory of relativity. ([50], p. 749)16
Though he doesn’t explicitly name the individual constants associated to the in-
gredient theories (viz. c, ~, G—see the next section), it is reasonable to surmise
my free time about the quantum problem from the standpoint of relativity. I do not think the theory will
have to discard the continuum. But I was unsuccessful, so far, to give tangible shape to my favourite
idea, to understand the quantum theory with the help of differential equations by using conditions of
over-determination ...” ([10], p. 257: from their private correspondence). By 1926 he was “toiling
at deriving the equations of motion of material particles regarded as singularities from the differential
equations of general relativity” (ibid., p. 258).
15This openness of Einstein to the possibility of a quantum theoretical modification of general rela-
tivity would not last for long, of course, and was already beginning to sour at this stage. His taste for
quantum theory soon soured to the extent that towards the end of his life he was searching for ways
to reproduce quantum mechanical phenomena using a purely classical field theory. Suraj Gupta (who
developed a special-relativistic theory of quantum gravity in the 1950s) has a different (inverted) inter-
pretation of Einstein’s underlying reasons for distrusting quantum mechanics: “Because his theory is
different from other field theories, he tried to construct unified field theories and because he could not
see how his theory in the curved space could possibly be quantized, he criticized quantum mechanics”
([48], p. 253).
16“Eine der wichtigsten Zukunftsaufgaben, die in dieser hinsicht der physikalischen Axiomatik
gestellt ist, ist wohl die Einfu¨gung der Quantentheorie in das System der allgemeinen Rela-
tivita¨tstheorie.”
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that this is what Haas had in mind in the following passage:
The main task of the axiomatization of physics will be the problem concerning the integration of the
universal constants of physics. Also the solution of this question may be expected to reveal deeper
knowledge of the relations, only intimated by Hilbert, holding between gravity and electricity, and of a
further integration of these relations with the quantum hypothesis. (ibid., p. 750)17
This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that Haas went on to consider the
various possible combinations of other constants in other contexts, investigating
the way they demarcate domains [51].
Quantum theory was invoked several times (in discussions of general relativity,
and unified field theories) to mark some kind of boundary of the applicability of a
theory.18 Einstein himself expressed just this view, in a lecture entitled “Ether and
the Theory of Relativity” at the University of Leyden, May 5th 1920. This address
is interesting for many reasons, historical and philosophical. For our purposes it is
interesting because Einstein once again speculates on the possible restrictions that
the quantum theory might place on general relativity:
Further, in contemplating the immediate future of theoretical physics we ought not unconditionally to
reject the possibility that the facts comprised in the quantum theory may set bounds to the field theory
beyond which it cannot pass.
Indeed, we can find several examples of Einstein expressing this kind of sentiment.
Inasmuch as his comments (here and in his 1916 paper) have been investigated by
historians, it has tended to be in the context of the study of gravitational waves. It is
true that gravitational waves are naturally involved here, but since Einstein is con-
sidering the possibility that the radiation of such waves is quantized, we ultimately
have what can also be seen as heralding the beginning of quantum gravity.19
Perhaps the most famous interplay between gravity and quantum prior to 1930
was Bohr’s usage of general relativity to argue against Einstein’s ‘photon in a box’
critique of his interpretation of quantum mechanics, at the 1927 Solvay Congress.
As Oskar Klein explains:
We know from BOHR’s account how ingeniously EINSTEIN defended his standpoint—the essential
incompleteness of the quantal description of nature—and how BOHR refuted every one of his argu-
ments with more than ingenuity. What impressed us younger people most was, I think, the “Einstein
box,” where BOHR successfully turned general relativity theory against EINSTEIN. ... And still EIN-
STEIN, who accepted all defeats with the utmost fairness but without changing his basic view, may
17“Aufgabe der physikalischen Axiomatik sein wird; es ist das Problem des Zusammenhanges zwis-
chen den universellen Konstanten der Physik. Auch die Lo¨sung dieser Frage darf vielleicht erhofft
werden von einer tieferen Erkenntnis der von Hilbert erst angedeuteten Beziehungen zwischen Gravi-
tation und Elektrizitat und von einer Verknu¨pfung dieser Beziehungen mit der Quanten-hypothese.”
18For example, Goldstein and Ritter note how Weyl adopts this position in his Raum, Zeit, Materie
([43], p. 104).
19The beginnings of quantum gravity are usually traced back to a 1930 paper of Le´on Rosenfeld’s;
however, there was, aside from Einstein’s remarks, quite a lot of activity dealing with the general
problem of quantum gravity, i.e. concerning the joint treatment of quantum and gravity. Though
Rosenfeld’s paper was, so far as I know, the first paper to apply the then newly developed methods of
quantum field theory to the problem, thus treating the gravitational field like the successfully quantized
electromagnetic field.
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have felt that on the side of the quantum physicists the importance of the general relativity claim in the
search for the laws of the microworld was usually underestimated. ([63], p. 117)
Einstein used quantum theory and special relativity to try to circumvent the Heisen-
berg relations. Bohr used a combination of quantum theory and general relativity
in order to eliminate the inconsistency that Einstein derived. As Christian Møller
recalls:
Well I remember of course the excitement when Bohr was able to beat Einstein with his own weapon.
That was at a Solvay meeting; Einstein invented a way of showing that quantum mechanics was not
consistent. He proposed to determine the energy of the photon which had come out of the box by
weighing the box before and afterwards. Then Bohr could show that if one takes Einstein’s formula for
the rate of a clock in a gravitational field then it comes exactly to making the thing consistent again.
And Gamow even made a model of this box with a spring and clock and shutter, which opened at a
certain time and closed again at a certain time. Mo¨ller [http://www.aip.org/history/ohilist/
4782.html]
We can see from this brief look at the early days of the quantum-gravity interface
that there was a real desire to join the two theories together and ‘complete the
revolution’.20 Moreover, there was a general belief that constructing such a theory
would be ‘business as usual’. That is, it was generally assumed that there would
be no special difficulty in quantizing the gravitational field. The earliest attempts
to bring these theoretical frameworks together involved the same methods as had
and would be used for the other fundamental interactions.21
3
PLANCK SCALE PRAGMATISM
The issue of defining quantum gravity is itself fraught with some historical difficul-
ties. The notion has changed as other areas of physics (and mathematics and cos-
mology) have advanced. Ashtekar and Geroch, in their review of quantum gravity,
characterize quantum gravity as “some physical theory which encompasses the
principles of both quantum mechanics and general relativity” (Ashtekar and Ge-
roch, 1974, p. 1213). This leaves a fair amount of elbowroom for the form such a
theory might take.
We can, however, say with certainty at what scales quantum gravitational effects
would be expected to manifest themselves. This follows from the fact that there is
a unique way to mix the fundamental constants that characterise the ‘ingredient’
theories so as to generate units of (L)ength, (M )ass, and (T )ime. From general
relativity we have the gravitational (or Newton) constant GN (equal to 6.67 ×
10−11m3/kg sec2), characterising the scale at which generally relativistic effects
20Though this barely skims the surface of a deep vein of early work on quantum gravity. For a more
detailed, thorough study of the very earliest research on quantum gravity, see [77].
21As Abhay Ashtekar puts it, the methodology was “to do unto gravity as one would do unto any
other physical field” ([2], p. 2). As is becoming clear after decades of intense effort, gravity is not like
any other force, at least not in terms of its formal representation, nor, many believe, in terms of how it
is (or ought to be) conceptualized.
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matter, and from quantum field theory we have c (the velocity of light in vacuo)
and ~, Planck’s constant of quantum action. These combine to give us:
LP =
√
~GN
c
3
= 1.616× 10−35m (1)
TP =
√
~G
c
5
= 5.59× 10−44sec (2)
MP =
√
~c
GN
= 2.177× 10−5g (3)
At these scales, all three physical theories are expected to play a role, and (if we
accept that general relativity is a theory of spacetime geometry) it is this scale that
we expect quantum geometry to dominate. Curiously, these units were discovered
by Planck almost three decades before quantum field theory was discovered, and
almost two decades before general relativity was completed (and six years before
special relativity): [75]. Planck was interested in producing universal descriptions
of the world, that could even be understood by extraterrestrial civilisations! For
this reason he pursued a set of natural scales that would make no reference to such
local circumstances as the size of the Earth or aspects of its orbit and rotation.22
A kind of (quite understandable) pragmatism guided the early neglect of quan-
tum gravity research. The scales at which phenomena would be apparent were
known then to be well out of reach of direct tests.23 Though Dirac believed quite
firmly that general relativity and quantum theory would have something to say to
each other (and indeed did important work on the subject), he nonetheless accepted
the pragmatic argument:
Since the time when Einstein’s general theory of relativity first appeared, various more general spaces
have been proposed. Each of these would necessitate some modifications in the scheme of equations
22See [44] for more on the curious discovery of these units and their subsequent propagation into
early quantum gravity research. Note that by the mid-1950s the notion of the Planck length was under-
stood by those working on the so-called canonical approach as a measure of the fluctuations of spatial
geometry. For those working along spacetime covariant approaches, the Planck length marked a natural
boundary to the wavelengths of quantum fields. See §4 for more on these two approaches.
23The characteristic ‘Planck length’ is computed by dimensional analysis by combining the con-
stants that would control the theory of quantum gravity into a unique length. As shown above, this
is lp =
√
~G/c3 = 1.6 × 10−33cm: a minuscule value, making gravity (effectively) a ‘collec-
tive phenomenon’ requiring lots of interacting masses. That quantum gravitational effects will not be
measurable on individual elementary particles is, therefore, quite clear: indeed, the Planck energy is√
~c5/G = 1022MeV ! Bryce DeWitt devised rigorous arguments to show this to be the case: the
gravitational field itself does not make sense at such scales. He showed that the static field from such a
particle (with a mass of the order 10−20 in dimensionless units) would not exceed the quantum fluctu-
ations. The static field dominates for systems with masses greater than 3.07×10−6. The gravitational
field is from this viewpoint an ‘emergent’ “statistical phenomenon of bulk matter” ([23] p. 372). An
earlier version of this viewpoint was suggested by van Dantzig [18]. The idea that gravity is emergent,
has gained in popularity recently: see [69] for a review.
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of atomic physics. The effects of these modifications on the laws of atomic physics would be much too
small to be of any practical interest, and would therefore be, at most, of mathematical interest. ([28], p.
657)
However, Oskar Klein (describing his own approach as a contribution to “an inti-
mate alliance of the two fundamental viewpoints of present physics, that of com-
plementarity and that of relativity” ([63], p. 117)) describes and rejects this prag-
matist attitude:
Now, it is very usual to regard the point of view of general relativity as insignificant in quantum theory
because the direct effects of gravitation in ordinary atomic phenomena are very small.This, however,
may easily be the same kind of fallacy, which it would have been to regard the electron spin as unim-
portant for the formulation of the laws of chemical binding, because the direct interaction between spin
magnetic moments is, in general, negligible compared with chemical binding energies.
[W]e shall tentatively take the point of view that general relativity is fundamental for the formulation
of the laws of quantum field theory and that the demand of an adequate formulation of other invariance
claims, e.g. that of gauge invariance, should be regarded as an indication of the need for a natural
generalization of the relativity postulate. [ibid, p. 98]
As I suggested above, a second factor behind the neglect was that the early views
on quantum gravity were tightly bound to the quantization of the electromagnetic
field in quantum electrodynamics. It was thought that there would be no special
puzzles caused by quantizing the gravitational field, since surely one classical field
is much like any other. For example, in their famous paper marking the birth of
QED Heisenberg and Pauli wrote:
We might also mention, that quantization of the gravitational field, which also appears to be necessary
for physical reasons, may be carried out by means of an analogous formalism to that applied here
without new difficulties. ([52], p. 3)24
These days we have a few more physical, quasi-empirical reasons to think that a
quantum theory of gravity is necessary. General relativity is now (thanks to the sin-
gularity theorems) firmly believed to generically predict spacetime singularities. It
is thought that our own universe may have emerged from such a singularity (= “the
big bang”, and may wind up in another (= “the big crunch”). It is also thought that
they may exist in within our Universe inside black holes. General relativity does
not apply to singular situations, so a theory of quantum gravity is expected to tell
us what happens here. Such reasoning was not open to the earliest researchers
on quantum gravity since inasmuch as they were understood at all, singularities
were thought to be fictional. Nor did the big bang model (and the notion of a big
crunch) exist during the initial phases of quantum gravity research—even when it
was conjectured, it was not taken up easily).
Another piece of information that suggests the need for a quantum theory of
gravity came from the consideration of quantum field theory on (fixed) black hole
24“Erwa¨hnt sei noch, daβ auch eine Quantelung des Gravitationsfeldes, die aus physikalischen
Gru¨nden notwendig zu sein scheint, mittels eines zu dem hier verwendeten vollig analogen Formal-
ismus ohne neue Sehwierigkeiten durchfu¨hrbar sein du¨rfte.” Note that Heisenberg and Pauli explicitly
mention the remark of Einstein’s from 1916, along with Klein’s 1927 paper on five-dimensional quan-
tum theory, in a footnote attached to this passage.
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spacetimes. Hawking discovered that in such a semi-classical theory (QFT cou-
pled to a classical gravitational field), black holes emit radiation and can evaporate
(= “The Hawking Effect”). However, the semi-classical theory is not sufficient to
analyse all aspects of the process, since the ‘end point’ falls outside. There are sev-
eral possibilities for the final stage: a (most likely Planck-scale) remnant, unitary
evolution (not to be had in the purely semiclassical theory), or total evaporation
(and, therefore, information loss).25
We might also mention the predicted value of the cosmological constant (the
energy of empty space) made by quantum field theory, on the basis of the zero-
point modes.26 The observed value for the energy density comes out very close
to zero: ρ ' 10−30gcm−3. This is a very long way from quantum field theory’s
prediction. One way to bring this value down is by imposing a cutoff at the Planck
length, ignoring those modes that have wavelengths smaller than this, or by turning
on the interactions between the vibrational modes.
These other reasons would take some time, and required advances in cosmol-
ogy and astrophysics, amongst other things. The nature of the problem of quan-
tum gravity adapted itself to these new conditions, by setting itself new puzzles
(such as the conditions surrounding the big bang and within the interior of a black
hole) and by utilizing any new data as targets that a respectable approach must hit.
The construction of renormalized quantum field theory, and the renormalization
group, would also stimulate and radically modify new work on quantum gravity.
Certainly, by the 1950s, it was no longer believed that the quantization of the grav-
itational would be a matter of course.
4
THE SLOW AND DIFFICULT BIRTH OF QUANTUM GRAVITY
Although the quantum description of the gravitational field has many points of similarity to conven-
tional quantum field theory, it nevertheless seems incapable—or capable only with difficulty—of in-
corporating certain conventionally accepted notions. [Bryce DeWitt [1], p. 330]
Bryce DeWitt was one of the first people to write a doctoral thesis on quan-
tum gravity, which he did under the (somewhat minimal) supervision of Julian
Schwinger at Harvard University in 1950, a time when quantum gravity research
was still very unfashionable. He wrote the words above in 1962. Though they are
25The fact that black holes are thought to radiate implies that they possess an entropy too. Bekenstein
computed this as kB AAL2
P
(i.e. the entropy goes up a quarter as fast as the black hole’s horizon, or
surface area, goes up). This result offers a number that the latest approaches to quantum gravity are
expected to be able to derive—many of them are indeed able to do so.
26The energy spectrum of an harmonic oscillator, namely EN = (N + 1/2)ω, has a non-zero
ground state in quantum mechanics. This is the zero-point energy, standardly explained by reference to
the uncertainty principle (i.e. there’s no way to freeze a particle). In the context of (free) quantum field
theory the field is understood to be an infinite family of such harmonic oscillators, and as a result the
energy density of the quantum vacuum is going to be infinite on account of the nonzero contribution
from each vibrational mode of the fields being considered.
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expressed with an air of obviousness, they encode within them more than four
decades of struggle to try and treat the gravitational field and quantum theory
within in the same framework.
Between 1950 and 1962 gravitation research underwent a significant trans-
formation, as a result of several (often interdependent) factors. DeWitt himself
dropped gravitation research after his doctoral work, and worked instead on det-
onation hydrodynamics (specifically computer simulations). This work would in
fact turn out to be highly applicable in general relativity in the subfield of nu-
merical relativity. DeWitt became a pioneer in numerical relativity, and discov-
ering ways of programming aspects of relativity. A technique he developed at
Livermore—multidimensional (two and three dimensions in DeWitt’s example)
Lagrangian hydrodynamics [21]—was later used in the gravitational 2-body prob-
lem and black hole simulations.27 One might think of this as a flow of ideas from
his war work into gravitational research. However, the flow worked both ways:
DeWitt was able to develop his ideas on higher dimensional Lagrangian hydrody-
namics on account of his general relativistic background with general coordinate
invariance and Jacobians. However, there is no doubt at all that his experience with
computing influenced his thinking enormously.
DeWitt was involved in a a chain of interesting events relating to the history of
quantum gravity. He was a physicist emerging right at the end of the second world
war. Moreover, he did his postgraduate work at Harvard, where there was a close
connection between the students’ work and military applications—many did their
‘work experience’ on military projects. Those who had done work for the military
developed a certain ‘number crunching’ mindset. There is little doubt that this
modus operandi filtered in to the work that resulted after the war. DeWitt’s work
especially was highly computational.
However, there were other key circumstances that contributed to the fortunes of
quantum gravity research (bringing DeWitt back into the fold in a central way), in-
volving (amongst other things) DeWitt’s marriage to a French mathematical physi-
cist (Ce´cile Morette, a great organizer of conferences and people, as well as a
great mathematical physicist herself), various interventions in relation to funding
opportunities by John Wheeler, an off-hand submission to an essay competition,
and industrial, military, and government support. One can see in this story the at-
tempts of various parties to produce a convergence of interests. This wasn’t always
possible. Scientists desire freedom to pursue whatever research project they desire
with sufficient resources to pursue their goals, and the industrial and government
sources have a more diverse set of goals and interests, include potential technolog-
ical applications (leading to financial gains and power gains), prestige, or perhaps
understanding of some aspect of the world.
In the case where the scientists have as their goal the “navigation among the po-
tentialities proffered by nature” John Stachel has described this process of conver-
27See [22] for DeWitt’s own reminiscences about his time at Livermore working on this approach,
and its later relevance—see also [89], p. 13.
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gence as one of “negotiation” ([94], p. 143). Any account of scientific discoveries
must take account of this milieu, though Stachel is quick to point out that this does
not imply the neglect of nature. Though there is a certain amount of elbow room
in scientific discoveries, and so the evolution of scientific research and the nature
of the theories that result, all of this this must be in accord with the “the poten-
tialities proffered by nature”.28 This is not strong social constructivism, then. The
contingency is very heavily constrained by nature.
Stachel goes on to give an alternative possible scientific history, in which a
different theory of gravitation was ‘discovered’ that was perfectly in accord with
nature’s potentialities (since it matches Einstein’s version on all relevant observ-
ables). He borrows the example from Feynman who asked: “Suppose Einstein
never existed, and the theory [of GR] was not available” (cited in [94], p. 146).29
Could one replicate ‘the physics’ of Einstein’s gravitational theory using what
other (non-geometrical) tools were available, namely special relativistic quantum
particle theory? The answer is Yes30, as several people had already suspected
before Feynman posed his question. One uses the fact that the gravitational in-
teraction has observed qualitative properties that can be encoded into field quanta
(named gravitons) with specific properties:
• Obeys inverse-square law—and so is long range
• is always attractive
• Macroscopicly observable
• Couples to all massive objects with equal strength independently of their
constitution
• Causes a red shift
• Bends light around the Sun
• Causes a correction (relative to Newton’s theory) in the perihelion of Mer-
cury
28Indeed, he gives as a very apt example, the U.S. Air Force’s support of ‘anti-gravity’ projects: no
amount of support of any calibre could generate such a phenomenon. In this sense, the goals of the
U.S. Air Force were not in accord with the potentialities of nature: no amount of coaxing was able to
bring it about. I might add that there was even a convergence between government and industry (in the
form of Roger Babson, a wealthy businessman who was searching for a gravity shield). For more on
these and related aspects of the history of general relativity, see: [42; 58; 61; 60; 79; 77].
29This question was asked in the context of a pivotal conference in the history of gravitational re-
search, including quantum gravity research: Conference on the Role of Gravitation in Physics. See
[27] for the report of this conference, and a description and assessment of the conference.
30Although the matter is not as straightforward as Stachel (and Feynman) suggest. For details on the
subtleties involved, see [102]. Note also that Stachel suggests the analysis takes place in the context of
quantum field theory; in fact the analysis involves the particle picture only.
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One then assigns properties to the exchange particle in a somewhat bespoke fash-
ion. We can see immediately that the particle must be massless in order to sat-
isfy the long-range requirement (and also to get the right value for the bending
of starlight around the Sun). The fact that gravitational effects can be seen at
macroscopic scales means that the particle must have integer spin. A more com-
plex argument is required for the attractiveness properties. We will skip this here
(but see [103] for the full argument), and simply note that a spin-2 particle is de-
manded in order to have universal attraction that couples in the right way to matter.
The particle must also self-interact by virtue of universality—it is this that causes
the nasty divergences in the quantum theory at high frequencies since it leads to
graviton-graviton coupling.
Hence, had certain contingent factors been otherwise, we might have had a very
different theory of gravitation.31 Though it is clear that there isn’t an unlimited
supply of empirically adequate alternatives, and they are often very hard to con-
struct. Inasmuch as one approach could be rationally (or logically, in Duff’s terms)
justified, so could the other. The selection of Einstein’s geometrical approach is
based on reasons outside of the standard cluster of empirical factors. In this case,
we have the pragmatism mentioned earlier, coupled with the mere temporal prece-
dence of the geometrical approach.
The two approaches are in fact jointly pursued to this day. Steven Weinberg’s
textbook on gravitation and cosmology uses the Lorentz invariant particle physics
approach. The approach matches his training as a particle physicist. The division
into two communities (the geometric relativists, and the analytical particle physi-
cists) is a genuine phenomena that has deeper ramifications. There goes, side by
side with the division, attitudes with respect to what are deemed relevant, impor-
tant, and interesting questions. Feynman in particular was of the opinion that the
particle physicist’s approach to general relativity involved a healthy rejection of
philosophical issues:
The questions about making a “quantum theory of geometry” or other conceptual questions are all
evaded by considering the gravitational field as just a spin-2 field nonlinearly coupled to matter and
itself ... and attempt to quantize this theory by following the prescriptions of quantum field theory, as
one expects to do with any other field. ([37], p. 377)
The general relativists by contrast show a deep engagement with conceptual issues,
having to do with the nature and existence of space, time, change, and so on.
In fact, many early approaches, including Birkhoff’s flat-space approach, were
rejected because they did not meet the requirements set by these latter tests. But,
still it is very possible that had quantum field theory been to hand earlier, and had
quantum gravity been seen as more of a pressing problem (e.g. if the pragmatic
argument was absent, or there was a greater desire for unification for the sake of
31Michael Duff makes a very similar point very clearly in his discussion of the approach to quantum
gravity that follows this ‘alternative path’ (covariant quantization): “the historical development of a
physical theory and its logical development do not always proceed side by side, and logically, the
particle physicist has no strong a priori reason for treating gravity as a special case” ([32], p. 79).
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unification), the flat space, special relativistic approach to gravity might have su-
perseded Einstein’s on account of its greater amenability in terms of quantizability,
and its formal coherence with the rest of physics.
We backtrack in the rest of this section, to investigate the earliest work on quan-
tum gravity. The aim here is to highlight the motivations behind construction,
selection, and rejection. The key tools are the use of simplification techniques and
analogies (with successful, superficially related theories).32
4.1 Linearization
Simplification often characterises the earliest work in some field. One might find
toy models, for example. Or, in cases were one has a non-linear theory, the use of
linearisation techniques. General relativity is a non-linear theory: gravity couples
to energy-momentum, and the gravitational field has energy-momentum, therefore
gravity gravitates. This is part and parcel of the equivalence principle. The non-
linearities lead to many (but by no means all) of the complications that are faced
in quantum gravity. Rosenfeld, in his 1930 work, attempted to quantize the linear
theory. This, as most acknowledge, is a preliminary exercise. One would attempt
to account for the nonlinearities by adding quantum corrections.
George Temple [96] introduced the perturbative method into GR, whereby the
metric tensor is expanded in powers of the gravitational coupling constant [96].
The linear expansion is, as mentioned, much easier to quantize: waves of a par-
ticular frequency ν are simply quantized according to Einstein’s relation E = ~ν
(where the energy packets ~ν are the gravitons33)—the higher order terms are
the problematic ones, since they determine graviton interactions (including self-
interactions). Solutions of the (unquantized) linearized field equations correspond
to weak gravitational radiation in empty space. The quantized radiation would
correspond to a small number of gravitons propagating in empty space.
In 1939 Pauli and Fierz, in a general study of the quantization of fields [38], also
employed the linear approximation of general relativity, and only considered this
linear field in interaction with the electromagnetic field.34 This approach was im-
32These two often come together as a package. For example, one of the simplification techniques
(discussed below) is to linearize the theory, so that the quanta of the theory do not interact and self-
interact. This is the case in quantum electrodynamics, the only successfully quantized theory in earlier
times. Hence, the simplifying move and the analogy move produce an equivalent result.
33According to Stachel, this particle was coined ‘graviton’ by Blokhintsev and Gal’perin [9]. There
is another usage of the term in 1935 by Sir Shah Sulaiman (a mathematician and high-court judge) who
put forward a competing theory to Einstein’s which postulates the existence of gravitons on which the
pull of gravity depends (Science News Letter, November 16, 1935, p. 309).
34In this paper, we also find for the first time the idea that gravity corresponds to a massless, spin-2
field, so that the particle carrying the force would be massless and spin-2 (note that the presence of
spin-2 particles implies that a theory containing them would, ceteris paribus, be generally covariant).
Thus, they write: “for vanishing rest-mass, our equations for the case of spin 2 go over into those of the
relativity theory of weak gravitational fields (i.e. gµν = δµν + γµν , neglecting terms of order higher
than the first in γµν ); the ‘gauge-transformations’ are identical with the changes induced in γµν by
infinitesimal co-ordinate transformations” ([38], p. 214)—see also (Fierz, 1939; Fierz and Pauli, 1939)
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portant for future developments in quantum gravity research, however, it suffered
from an inability to recover the perihelion in the classical limit (when coupled to
matter).35 Given the desire to have a theory of gravity that was in step with the
other forces, the approach was, nonetheless, developed further.
Suraj Gupta was the first to explicitly split the metric tensor apart, into a flat
Minkowskian part and the residue. The residue was conceived as a gravitational
field potential, and would represent the gravitational interaction. Hence, the theory
amounts to a specially relativistic quantum field theory of gravitation. Gupta tack-
led the problem in two stages: first he considered the linear theory (as Pauli and
Fierz had done). This has the problem that there are negative energy states, with
no physical counterpart. He then, in a second paper, considers the gravitational
field interacting with the full energy-momentum tensor.
Belinfante and Swihart developed a version of this approach (for which they
claim priority over Gupta: [4], p. 2). They initially attempted a quantization
of Birkhoff’s theory of gravity but were unable to find a Lagrangian that gave
Birkhoff’s equations of motion—a fact they interpreted as the inability of the the-
ory to satisfy the reciprocity (i.e. action-reaction) principle linking gravity and
matter.
The earliest approaches to quantum gravity in this sense (i.e. in the sense of
quantization of the gravitational field) were, quite naturally, pursued by those
who had skills in quantum field theory. However, even as early as 1938 Jacques
Solomon argued that the standard field quantizations methods would fail for strong
gravitational fields, for then the approach ceases to give a good approximation to
Einstein gravity ([92], p. 484).36 Alternative approaches were suggested as the
extent of the problems facing quantum field theory became ever more apparent. In
particular, it was argued that quantum field theory might be better adjusted to fit
general relativity, rather than the other way around:
Obscurity is about to come to an end. Quantum field theory has now reached a stage where the emer-
gence of new points of view alone will lead to real progress. A considerable step forward was made
immediately after the second world war when Schwinger in this country and Tomanaga in Japan, and
with them several other investigators, introduced consistently (special) relativistic procedures into the
quantum theory of the electromagnetic field. Further progress on a fundamental level will very likely
be brought about by the introduction of general-relativistic approaches into quantum field theory. This
opinion is based on the fact that general relativity gives us a deeper understanding of the nature of fields
and their relationships to particles than has been achieved anywhere else in theoretical physics. This
understanding will be preserved by any theory that will maintain the principle of equivalence (similar-
ity of gravitation with inertial effects, such as centrifugal ”forces”), even though it may deviate in its
specific details from the general theory of relativity as it was originally conceived by Einstein. ([7], p.
112)
(especially 6 from the latter).
35Birkhoff later developed a theory of gravitation based on flat spacetime [8], and this was quantized
by his student Moshinsky [67]. However, it suffered from the same empirical problems that Pauli and
Fierz’s theory faced. Note that the covariant approach is not the only approach to involve flat space.
The ADM (Arnowitt, Deser, Misner) approach (a canonical approach: see below) also involves flat
space quantization (the flatness is in this case asymptotic).
36As Stachel notes ([93], p. 561), Solomon, along with Matvei Bronstein (another early maverick in
quantum gravity), were both casualities of the war, of Hitler and Stalin respectively.
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The linearization approach was recognized to be a provisional step up the lad-
der. Even at this early stage of development (and though there were alternative
approaches), we can see rational moves in operation guiding the evaluation of the
linearization approaches.
4.2 The Electrodynamical Analogy
Formal analogies between general relativity and Maxwell’s theory of electromag-
netism misled quantum gravity researchers for many years.37 As Bryce DeWitt
nicely put it, at the time of the first studies of quantum gravity “[q]uantum field
theory had ... scarcely been born, and its umbilical cord to electrodynamics had
not yet been cut” ([25], p. 182).38 Moreover, renormalized QED was not yet
constructed, and so the divergences could not even be properly conceptualized, yet
alone resolved. Note, the analogy to electrodynamics even pervaded the early nam-
ing of the theory of quantum gravity, which was labeled ‘quantum gravidynamics’
(a name long since discarded).
Among the very earliest studies was a paper by Leon Rosenfeld in which he
undertook a (tree-level, lowest perturbative order39) computation of the gravita-
tional self-energy of a photon. It was known that the electron’s interaction with its
own field (the electron’s electromagnetic ‘self-energy’) suffered from divergences
(attributed to its non-vanishing mass), and, as was to be expected, Rosenfeld’s
calculation revealed (quadratic) divergences for the gravitational case too.40 This
37However, in many cases the analogies were necessary to get a foot hold on general relativity. For
example, in the context of gravitational radiation the notion of electromagnetic radiation offered many
essential clues. Felix Pirani is unequivocal about the utility of this radiation analogy (partial though
it is): “Some analogy has to be sought, because the concept of radiation is until now largely familiar
through electromagnetic theory, and one cannot define gravitational radiation sensibly without some
appeal to electromagnetic theory for guidance” ([74], p. 91).
38However, the formulation of Maxwell’s theory, championed by Mandelstam, using path-dependent
variables (holonomies) was very productive, leading the way to loop gravity—see (Mandelstam, 1962),
p. 353 and also (Gambini and Pullin, 1996).
39In field theory one seeks to calculate the amplitude for occurrence of processes. The perturbative
approach, where one expands some quantity in powers of the coupling constant of the theory, offers
the standard methodology. Feynman developed a fairly mechanical diagrammatic notation for doing
these computations. There are two types of diagram: those with (one or more) closed loops and those
without closed loops. The latter are known as tree diagrams, and they are the simplest to evaluate
since the (4-momenta of the) external lines determine the (4-momenta of the) internal lines, with no
need to perform integration over the internal momentum variables. By contrast, diagrams with closed
loops have internal lines that are not determined by the external ones. For each loop there is a 4-fold
integration to be performed (each involving integration over the independent momentum variables).
40Though Rosenfeld was one of the earliest quantizers of gravity, by 1966 he was less convinced that
there was a problem of quantum gravity [82]. Or at least, in his mind the problem had been radically
misconceived as a mathematical one (involving the necessity of unification on the basis of formal
inconsistencies) instead of an empirical one. For Rosenfeld that absence of empirical clues meant that
one could only ever probe quantum gravity from the “epistemological side”, which implied that the
considerations could not establish the conformity of any such investigations to the world of phenomena:
“no logical compulsion exists for quantizing the gravitational field” (p. 606). Peter Bergmann called
the problem one of “esthetic unease” ([5], p. 364).
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pointed to a generic problem facing any field theory.41
The electrodynamic analogy already began to break down at the classical level,
as a result of the investigation into gravitational radiation and the possibility of
its measurement. The measurement of electromagnetic radiation involves third
derivatives of position—one measures a fluctuating ‘jerky’ force (accelerations
alone would give a steady force). Forces are represented by gradients of potentials,
in this case the force is given by the first spatial derivative of the potential, so that
the radiation must be given by the derivative of this, namely the second spatial
derivative of the potential telling us how the force is changing. In general relativity,
on the other hand, the situation is more complicated. Radiation would be given by
the third derivative of the potential—the second derivative would describe a static
gravitational field (i.e. curvature).
A second difference concerns the difference in the respective charges of elec-
tromagnetism and gravitation. In the case of the electromagnetic field, there are
both positive and negative charges, so one can get neutralising effects. In the case
of gravity there are only ‘positive’ charges (or at least just one kind of charge, all
with the same sign).
A third difference concerns the non-linearity of gravitational interactions. Any
quantization of the theory would result in quanta that interacted with each other,
and self -interacted! This is quite unlike the situation in quantum electrodynamics,
which turned out to be special in respect of its linearity. These blatant differences
did not deter researchers, for the case of quantized Maxwell theory was one of the
few available tools to guide theory construction, in spite of its imperfect fit.
The divergence problem (in standard non-gravitational quantum field theory)
guided the development of the early work in very large part. Mandelstam was
concerned with avoiding the use of an indefinite metric to construct a quantum
field theory. Pauli and Ka¨llen had argued (in their study of the Lee model with
cutoff [70]) that there were a certain values g > gcritical of the coupling constant
at which the use of a Riemannian metric breaks down and the theory becomes
non-renormalizable. Mandelstam (like many others) claimed that this was un-
physical.42
However, in the 1960s, the electromagnetic analogy did bear some fruit in the
detection of quantities of the ‘right sort’ for classical and quantum gravity; namely,
coordinate independent, gauge-invariant observables. If one can find these observ-
ables, then one could in principle turn them into operators and construct a Hamil-
tonian. In the electromagnetic case, one has the electric and magnetic fields at
one’s disposal. These are gauge invariant entities. However, if one then consid-
ers the behaviour of charges interacting with the fields, then operators associated
41DeWitt later performed a gauge-invariant, Lorentz covariant version of Rosenfeld’s computation
(using the tools of renormalization that had only recently been showcased at the first Shelter Island
conference). DeWitt showed that contra Rosenfeld, the analysis revealed the necessity of charge renor-
malization, rather than a non-vanishing mass).
42The introduction of an indefinite metric to resolve divergence problems in quantum field theory
was given by Dirac in 1942 [29].
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with the particles are not gauge invariant: gauge transformations alter the phase
of the particles. The solution is to consider path-dependent quantities known as
holonomies (see [66], p. 347):
(4) Φ(x, P ) = φ(x)e−ie
∫ x
P
dzmAm(z)
Hence, rather than working with local particle operators, one works with these
spread out quantities (and the electromagnetic field). This approach retains the
covariance of the original theory. Mandelstam argues that, in this case at least,
“there is a close analogy between the electromagnetic field and the gravitational
field” ([66], p. 353). The development of Yang-Mills theory saw the develop-
ment of a new analogy. Because of the closer similarities between Yang-Mills
fields and the gravitational field (both are non-linear and have infinite dimensional
gauge groups), Murray Gell-Man suggested to Feynman (in the late 1950s), who
was becoming interested, that he attempt to quantize Yang-Mills theory first, as a
preparatory exercise ([37], p. 378). This led to groundbreaking work in the con-
struction of quantum gauge field theories (of the kind that make up the current
standard model of particle physics).
4.3 Gravity as a Natural Cutoff
As explained above, much of the early work was characterised by a desire to con-
struct a theory free of divergences: a finite theory. Or at least a theory with ‘con-
trollable’ infinities. There were several methods that were developed to achieve
this, based around the introduction of fundamental length scales. The potential
utility of introducing gravity into elementary particle physics, so as to eliminate
divergencies, spurred on work on quantum gravity enormously. The most obvious
strategy is to impose a cutoff. There were many suggestions that gravity might act
in this way, as some kind of ‘regulator’. The divergences in question were those
of QED, and meson theories, which were still, pre-WWII, a somewhat mathemat-
ically murky territory. The problem concerned the transitions between quantum
states, during which time (a very short time, determined by the uncertainty rela-
tions) energy conservation is violated. The great hope for introducing gravity into
elementary particle physics was that it would terminate the wavelengths before
they get to the problematic high-energy (ultraviolet) wavelengths.
Pauli makes several comments to this effect, including the following remarks in
a letter addressed to Abrikosov, Khalatnikov, and Pomeranchuk:
I was very interested in Landau’s remarks on the possibility of a connection of the cut-off moment
of quantum electrodynamics with gravitational interaction (his article “on quantum theory of fields”
in the Bohr-festival volume). It appeals to me, that the situation regarding divergencies would be
fundamentally changed, as soon as the light-cone itself is not any longer a c-number equation. Then
every given direction is space-time would have some “probability to be on the light-cone”, which would
be different from zero for a small but finite domain of directions. I, however, that the conventional
quantization of the gµν -field is consistent under this circumstances.
(Zu¨rich, 15 August 1955; in [109], p. 329)
22 DEAN RICKLES
He followed up on this same line in his comments after a talk by Oskar Klein:
It is possible that this new situation so different from quantized theories invariant with respect to the
LORENTZ group only, may help to over- come the divergence difficulties which are so intimately
connected with a c-number for the light-cone in the latter theories. (Pauli in (Klein, 1956), p. 6928)
However, as with the linearization approaches, and those based on the electromag-
netic analogy, the divergences in the gravitational case were more complicated
than had been used to, for precisely the reasons Pauli alludes to:
[I]t must constantly be borne in mind that the bad divergences of quantum gravidynamics are of an
essentially different kind from those of other field theories. They are direct consequences of the fact
that the light cone itself gets shifted by the non-linearities of the theory. But the light-cone shift is
precisely what gives the theory its unique interest, and a special effort should be made to separate the
divergences which it generates from other divergences. ((DeWitt, 1962), p. 374).
In his PhD thesis Bryce DeWitt, under the supervision of Julian Schwinger, sought
to revisit Rosenfeld’s work on the computation of gravitational self-energies. De-
Witt would also revisit the idea of Landau that gravity might act as a natural reg-
ulator [26]. Though Landau didn’t explicitly mention the Planck scale (he placed
the location of the cutoff much higher), Pauli appeared to think that Landau had
quantum gravitational effects in mind. It is clear that if there is a fundamental
length, below which quantum field theoretic processes cannot operate, then one
has what Landau sought. DeWitt was able to confirm that (at lowest order of per-
turbation) when gravity is included, the self-energies of charged particles (and the
gravitons themselves) remain finite (though often very large).
More indirect, however, was Peter Bergmann’s method of utilising the fact that
the gravitational field equations determined particle trajectories free of any no-
tions of divergences. He believed this would follow from the analysis of Einstein,
Hoffmann and Infeld, according to which the assumption of geodesy for a free par-
ticle’s motion was redundant, since it already could be seen to follow (by a method
of successive approximation) from the field equations alone.
I might also note here that ultimately string theory emerged from the diver-
gences problems facing quantum field theories of fields other than the electromag-
netic field (particularly the strong interaction). In particular, since the perturba-
tive approach breaks down when the coupling constant determining interactions
strengths is high (as in strong interaction physics), alternative approaches were
sought in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s. One of the more popular of
these approaches combined Heisenberg’s S-matrix theory with dispersion theory.
The S-matrix is a tool to encode all possible collision processes. Heisenberg sug-
gested that one take this to embody what was relevant about the physics of collision
processes. In particular, all that was observable were the inputs and outputs of col-
lision processes, observed when the particles are far enough apart in spacetime to
be non-interacting, or free. This back box approach to physics was very much in-
spired by the Copenhagen philosophy. The dispersion relation approach to physics
tried to construct physical theories on the basis of a few central physical axioms,
such as unitarity (conservation of probabilities), Lorentz invariance, and causality
QUANTUM GRAVITY MEETS &HPS 23
(effects can’t precede causes). These two approaches were combined, by Geoff
Chew amongst others, so that the focus was on the analytic properties of the S-
matrix. One model for the S-matrix, incorporating some other principles thought
to be involved in strong interaction physics, was the Veneziano model. This used
the Euler beta function to encode the various desirable properties of the S-matrix.
The model was found to be generated by a dynamical theory of strings. (See [16]
for a detailed historico-philosophical account of the early development of string
theory.)
4.4 Discretization
A development of the cutoff idea, and the idea that there might be a minimal (fun-
damental) length, leads quite naturally into the idea that space and time might not
be continuous, but better modelled instead by a discrete lattice or similar structure.
This was suggested by several people. In a paper from 1930 Ambarzumian and
Iwanenko [1] argued for the introduction of a spatial lattice structure for physical
space as a way of eliminating the infinite divergences from the self-energy of the
electron. The basic idea was that the existence of a minimal length would imply a
maximal frequency (p. 567).43
Arthur Schild [87] investigated the properties of such a discrete lattice in order
to see if it would break essential symmetries. In particular, he was responding to
the objection that discrete theories would violate Lorentz invariance.44 He wasn’t
able to devise a model to preserved all such symmetries, but enough to provide a
plausible candidate for a background for a physical theory.
van Dantzig [18; 19] was motivated by a combination of general covariance (as
expressed in the Point-coincidence argument) and the definition of observability in
such a theory. van Dantzig argued that in a generally covariant theory the observ-
able things will be coincidences: events. van Dantzig argues that in order to not
introduce unmeasurable structure into the interpretation or formulation of one’s
theory, one should dispense with the existence of a four-dimensional continuum,
in favour of a discrete manifold of events.45
Bergmann describes the approach as one of “constructing ‘spaces’ that have
certain topological properties similar to those of point spaces in the large but do not
possess ‘points’ as elementary constituents” (Bergmann, following Wigner’s talk:
[108], p. 226). The general approach lives on in several of the current approaches,
including causal set theory and dynamical triangulations.
43I might add that this rich background of work on the mixture of geometry and quantum theory
provides a nice background out of which Matvei Bronstein’s work emerged—see [44].
44Rafael Sorkin would later defend the causal set approach from the same charge.
45I should point out that van Dantzig steers clear of positivism. He notes that “it is not sufficient to
take only observed events; we have to add to these also possibly observable, hence fictitious events”
(Comments after Wigner’s talk: [108], p. 224). I take it by ‘fictitious’ he means counterfactual: i.e.
they could be observed.
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4.5 General Relativisation of the Dirac Equation
As with the electrodynamical analogy that led to a flow of ideas from quantum
field theory to general relativity; so (at around the same time, though somewhat
earlier) there was a ‘geometrical analogy’, responsible for a flow from general
relativity to quantum theory. Following Einstein’s early remarks about the need
for some kind of relationship between gravitation and the quantum theory, much
of the work in the field of quantum gravity (up until the 30s) concentrated on
bringing the quantum theory in a form conducive to integration with (classical)
general relativity.
George Temple argued for a modification of the Dirac equation (of the electron)
on pain of “abandoning the theory of relativity” ([95], p. 352). Temple’s approach
was to construct a system of wave equations which possessed “all the advantages
as Dirac’s equations and which shall be tensorial in form in accordance with the
general theory of relativity” (ibid.). In a slightly different way, both Fock and
Weyl also attempted to merge the Dirac equation with the geometry of general
relativity. Their strategy (discovered independently) was to modify the structure
of the manifold so as to allow for spin—by adding (local) spinor structures. Fock
desired (and thought he’d achieved) a “geometrization of Dirac’s theory of the
electron and its subsumption within general relativity” ([40], p. 275). Together
with Iwanenko, they labeled their theory “quantum linear geometry”. The basic
idea was to modify the geometry in such a way as to include the properties of the
Dirac matrices. They suggest introducing a linear differential form ds = Σγνdxν
that when squared would deliver the standard Riemann interval ds2.
Fock believed that this approach could lead to solutions of the most pressing
problems in quantum field theory at that time (negative-energy solutions and the
ubiquitous divergences). Though he devised a near identical theory to Fock, Weyl
would later distance himself from the geometrization programme. See [88] for a
nice account of this episode.46
The mathematician Dirk Struik was invited to MIT by Norbert Wiener. Struik
had experience in the mathematics of general relativity, and had assisted in the
development of parts of the differential geometric and group theoretic aspects.
Wiener had met Struik on a visit to Go¨ttingen—cf. [84], p. 23. Together they
worked on a unified theory of general relativity, electromagnetism, and quantum
theory. The methodology was as above: to subsume quantum theory (in this case,
specifically Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics) within general relativity.
Wigner, perhaps more than anyone else (save Weyl), recognized the importance
of symmetry in quantum theory. Rather than focusing specifically on making the
Dirac equation generally relativistic, Wigner adopted the method of showing how
quantum mechanics itself was not really in any conflict with what he saw as the two
basic principles of general relativity; namely that “coordinates have no indepen-
46The general relativization of other physical systems continued for some time. John Wheeler ran a
seminar on Dirac’s Equation in general relativity as part of his course on advanced quantum mechanics
(in 1955)—this was transcribed by Charles Misner.
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dent meaning” and “that only coincidences in space-time can be observed directly
and only these should be the subject of physical theory” ([108], p. 219). Wigner
appears to have something like Kretschmann’s ‘point-coincidence’ objection to the
principle of general covariance in mind when he writes that “[t]his observation is
so stringent that, properly considered, every physical theory conforms with it ...
this is true also of the present day quantum mechanics” (ibid.).
His approach was to formulate a version of quantum mechanics without coor-
dinates, using just field components. Fred Hoyle was in agreement with Wigner,
calling the use of coordinates “a psychological survival from the Newtonian era”
([108], p. 224):
Now that we realize that coordinates are nonmore than parameters that must be eliminated in determin-
ing relations between observables, it becomes natural to ask whether we are using the most advanta-
geous parameters, or even whether any such parameters are necessary. (ibid.)
This introduces another distinction between the approaches: there are those that
seek to quantize the gravitational field, and those that seek to general relativize
quantum theory. Again, these two broad categories can be found in the current
crop of approaches to the problem of quantum gravity.
4.6 Canonical versus Covariant
Two distinct lines were clear very early on: that involving quantizing the full met-
ric, and that of quantizing a perturbation on a flat spacetime. The former ‘canoni-
cal’ approach involves the Hamiltonian formulation of general relativity in which
the canonical ‘configuration’ variable is the spatial metric (on a spatial hypersur-
face). However, the decomposition of the Einstein equations generates two quite
distinct families: six are ordinary evolution equations, but four are constraint equa-
tions on the initial data (the metric and its conjugate ‘momentum’. This approach
was widely believed to suffer a fatal flaw, in the factor ordering problem. However,
shifting to a new set of variables (in the 1980s) eradicated the problem.
The first (detailed) flat space quantization approach (to first order) of the grav-
itational field (nonlinearities and all) was conducted by Suraj Gupta [47; 46]. The
approach is distinctively particle physics-based. One begins with the classical La-
grangian and then applies standard field quantization methods to it. This involves
the detachment of the gravitational potential gµν from its geometrical role in gen-
eral relativity as ordinarily conceived. The particle physics approach is able to
‘mimic’ the geometrical aspects we normally associate with general relativity by
utilization multi-graviton exchange.
In more modern terms, covariant quantization of a gauge theory amounts to the
derivation of the Feynman rules for the propagators and the vertexes describing
the quanta of the theory. In other words, the approach proceeds by constructing
Feynman diagrams. These to hand, one can then ascertain whether the theory is
renormalizable at various loops.
The starting point in the covariant approach is a Lagrangian for gravity (with
matter or without, giving pure gravity). The Einstein-Hilbert Lagrangian is:
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(5) L = −√gR
Now recall that the perturbative approach involves the split into a flat background
ηµν (Minkowski spacetime) and a deviation from the flat background hµν (which,
when quantized, will represent gravitons):
(6) gµν = ηµν + hµν
If we make this split, then the Lagrangian must be modified accordingly:47
(7) L = −
(hαβ,ν
4
)2
+
(hαα,µ
4
)2
−
(hαα,βhβµ,µ
2
)
+
(hνβ,αhαβ,ν
2
)
+O(h3)
In addition to the problems of non-linearity (from the higher order terms: theO(h3
terms represent interactions, and are given as vertices in the Feynman diagrams)
that we met earlier, causing the divergences; there is also the problem of the in-
variance group of general relativity. While the divergence problem characterises
much of the earlier work (certainly the covariant approach), the curious nature of
the symmetry group characterises the later work (especially in the canonical ap-
proach). Just as the symmetry in the equations of Maxwellian electromagnetism
involves gauge freedom, leading to redundancy in the space of solutions (to be re-
moved by choosing gauge invariant quantities, or fixing a gauge) so to does general
relativity. In this case it is invariance under (infinitesimal) coordinate transforma-
tions:
(8) hµν = hµν + ξµ;ν + ξν;µ +O(ξ2µ)
Here ξµ(x) encodes the gauge freedom: one can choose arbitrary values without
changing the physical state (the solution: hµν). One must deal with this gauge
freedom somehow. The standard method is to impose a gauge condition on the
fields. One can then proceed to solve the Euler-Lagrange equations. The classical
(or ‘tree level’) case involves the computation of the scattering of classical gravi-
tons via the vertices and the propagators. The quantum case builds in closed loops
to the tree diagrams. The Feynman diagrams describe the possibilities of breaking
apart, forming loops, and joining together. Carrying out this procedure led Feyn-
man to the discovery of ‘ghosts’, a compensatory (unphysical) field needed purely
to render quantum Yang-Mills field theories consistent.48
There are several ways to achieve a covariant approach. Bryce DeWitt used
Rudolph Peierls (coordinate independent) version of the Poisson bracket to de-
fine the commutator in terms of Green’s functions. DeWitt was able to quantize
47For simplicity, I have written this out under the assumption that the Wick rotation has been per-
formed, taking ηµν to δµν with positive signature (+,+,+,+).
48In 1974 ’t Hooft and Veltman were able to show that Einstein’s theory of gravity (without matter
and in 4D) was finite at one loop; however, adding matter to the theory destroyed this [97]. In 1985 Go-
roff and Sagnotti later did the two loop computation and found that the theory was non-renormalizable
[45].
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the gravitational field without restricting himself to flat spacetime. The method,
known as the ‘background field method’, invoked physical degrees of freedom (in
this case, a stiff elastic medium, like a physical ether, and a field of clocks) to lo-
calize points, and there allow for the localization of physical quantities. The gravi-
tational field is taken to interact with this background field.49 Computationally, the
approach marked a great advance. However, the background is unphysical in most
realistic cases—but this highlights DeWitt’s (much like Feynman, and other physi-
cists with war experience) focus on getting the job done, and computing numbers,
over conceptual issues.
The canonical (Hamiltonian) approach was pursued in slightly different ways
by several schools. Bergmann was the first to apply canonical quantization meth-
ods to non-linear covariant field theories [6]. The Hamiltonian formulation of
classical general relativity was perfected by Dirac, in 1958 [30].50 The basic idea
is expressed by DeWitt as follows:
A canonical theory looks at spacetime as a sequence of 3-dimensional slices, each characterized by its
intrinsic 3-geometry. The slicing is, of course, not unique. However, if two 3-geometries are chosen,
one may try to solve the ‘Sandwich Problem’: find those spacetimes (4-geometries) which can have
these 3-geometries as slices. ([25], p. 186)
The four dimensional spacetime (diffeomorphism) symmetry of general relativity
is clearly broken (at least superficially) in this approach. The symmetry is canon-
ically rendered using four constraint functions on the chosen spatial manifold, a
scalar field (known as the scalar constraint) and a vector field (known as the diffeo-
morphism constraint). These have the effect, respectively, of pushing data on the
slice onto another nearby (infinitesimally close) slice and shifting data tangentially
to the slice. In a canonical approach (to field theories) one writes theories in terms
of fields and their momenta. Spacetime covariant tensors are split apart into spatial
(tangential) and temporal (normal) components. This naturally obscures general
covariance, but the theory is generally covariant despite surface appearances.
The general covariance of the Einstein equations, reflecting the spacetime dif-
feomorphism invariance of the theory, is encoded in constraints.51 Taken together,
when satisfied, these constraints are taken to reflect spacetime diffeomorphism in-
variance; together they tell us that the geometry of spacetime is not affected by the
49It is possible that this approach was developed by DeWitt using material he’d had to master for
his work in higher-dimensional Lagrangian hydrodynamics, in which one has to consider a mesh that
forms a dynamical background for the materials one is studying.
50Donald Salisbury has investigated the early history of the canonical quantization formalism, with
its introduction of ‘constraints’ (on which see below): [85; 86]. He traces crucial details back to
Rosenfeld. However, he entirely omits from his story equally crucial work by Paul Weiss (a student of
Max Born and Paul Dirac): [106; 107].
51Hamiltonian constraints, in general relativity, constitute an infinite set of relations holding between
the canonical variables of the theory (the spatial metric and its conjugate: (gµν , pµν)). Any choice of
physical variables must satisfy these constraints on some initial hypersurface. The constraints are taken
to generate (infinitesimal) coordinate transformations of the initial hypersurface. Since the theory is in-
dependent of coordinate transformations (on pain of underdetermination), these are taken to constitute
gauge transformations. Dirac developed a general framework for such constrained systems, classically
and quantum mechanically.
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action of the diffeomorphisms they generate. This job is done by two, of course,
since the diffeomorphism constraint deals with aspects of the spatial geometry and
the Hamiltonian constraint deals with aspects of time. Imposing both delivers the
desired full spacetime diffeomorphism invariance.
One then quantizes the theory, including the quantization of the constraints, so
that quantum states are annihilated by the full Hamiltonian constraint (a combina-
tion of the scalar and diffeomorphism constraints):
(9) HˆΨ[g] = 0
This equation (known as the Wheeler-DeWitt equation) contains all of the dynam-
ics in quantum geometrodynamics. The quantum states (the wave-functionals Ψ)
depend only on the 3-metric, not on time—hence, the solutions represent station-
ary wavefunctions. In fact, the diffeomorphism constraint implies that the quantum
states are only dependent on the 3-geometry rather than the metric—that is to say,
the states are invariant under diffeomorphisms of Σ thanks to the diffeomorphism
constraint. However, the geometrodynamical (so expressed) approach ran out of
steam due to technical difficulties. New variables based on a canonical transfor-
mation of the phase space of general relativity led to a more tractable formulation.
From the earliest phase of quantum gravity research to the present day, their is
a vast array of approaches, most highly distinct. They are constrained by much the
same factors: the facts we know about the world already, basic physical principles,
and mathematical consistency. However, analogy and simplification also play a
crucial role. The methods of simplification, and the analogies chosen are deter-
mined in large part (and quite naturally so) by the traditions of the practitioners:
by the tools they have to hand and by the range of theories that they are acquainted
with. This has elements of both Andy Pickering’s and Peter Galison’s approaches
to the development of theory. I’ll draw some of these points of contact out in the
next sections.
5
METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS
The historical review presented above is incomplete, and rather rough. However,
it contains elements that ought to be of interest to philosophers, historians, and so-
ciologists. QG research shows quite clearly many cases in which none of the stan-
dard predictivist models of scientific evaluation are operating. Novel predictions
are not an issue; certainly not in the earliest research. The pragmatic argument was
trundled out time and again to show that novel testable predictions were out of the
question, but research continued in spite of this consensus.52 Yet the fact that ‘ca-
sualties’ have occurred shows that evaluation is nonetheless in operation. It also
52There are, on the other hand, approaches which are inconsistent with old evidence. For these,
we can at least adopt some empirical criterion: accommodationism—though as a criterion it is still
applicable only to some episodes; other cases will violate it if an approach has other things going for it.
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reveals, even in the earliest work, a great diversity in competing approaches, many
of which are empirically indistinguishable (i.e. the canonical versus covariant ap-
proaches) yet conceptually quite distinct and with their own distinct set of internal
problems. As we saw with Stachel’s example of the geometric vs spin-2 field rep-
resentation of gravity, this can lead to genuine underdetermination: the geometric
understanding of general relativity that prevails might easily have been replaced
by a very different highly non-geometric one. The reasons are not experimental or
observational: it is more a matter of timing—cf. [17].
The ‘specialness’ of quantum gravity, and the challenge it poses for both scien-
tists and philosophers, sociologists, and historians, is that there is no direct empiri-
cal reason for thinking that the gravitational field exhibits quantum-like behaviour.
Nor is there any consensus on the ‘correct’ theory. If there were, the various other
approaches we have looked at would have been closed up and marked as at fault. It
is this open situation that renders the close inspection of quantum gravity’s history
a pressing task.
In what follows I make some initial headway on this task by comparing the two
strongest (historicist) methodologies with the development of quantum gravity. I
will then argue that a large part of the development of quantum gravity involves
tool-based reasons (in addition to more obvious factors such as the appeal to uni-
fication).
5.1 Lakatos Meets Quantum Gravity
How does the development of quantum gravity match up to Lakatos’ methodology
of scientific research programmes? Not so well, in some ways; but quite well in
others. According to this methodological model, fledgling research programmes
should not initially be rejected as a result of anomalies or inconsistencies, if the
theory is progressing well in other ways—this was, of course, implemented to take
care of the various problems cases facing Popper’s more stringent methodological
model. However, the central principle guiding the construction of quantum gravity
directed research programmes are precisely mathematical consistency and the ab-
sence of anomalies (and the ability to be consistent with known, already observed
data). Moreover, the empirical detachment of quantum gravity research means that
the leniency that Lakatos’ methodology allows for (namely, when there is empir-
ical progress in general) can not easily be applied here. Lakatos’ model seems
inapplicable to quantum gravity.
That being said, there are ways of making sense of the notion of an auxiliary
belt of assumptions, used to protect a programme’s hard core (describing the cen-
tral concepts and laws of the programme), in the case of quantum gravity. And
there are examples in which the modifications made to rescue a quantum gravity
programme from inconsistency and anomaly are not “blatantly ad hoc” (to use a
phrase of Cushing’s—[15], p. 78). In other words, we can find cases where the ad-
dition of an auxiliary assumption to solve one problem (and so, a blatantly ad hoc
move) has uses beyond the reason it was initially introduced. The most obvious
30 DEAN RICKLES
examples of this kind come from superstring theory, which I have ignored up until
now but will briefly discuss since it has been the subject of some philosophical
discussion recently.
In their recent Lakatosian-inspired assessment of superstring theory, Nancy
Cartwright and Roman Frigg draw attention to the broad range of possible factors
(other than testability) that can play a role in our evaluation of theories: ability to
unify, beauty, simplicity, etc. They also explain how string theory performs well in
some of these other “dimensions”. But, ultimately, they come down negatively on
the scientific status of string theory (and, by extension, quantum gravity research
in general):
[A] research programme that progresses only in some dimensions, while being by and large stagnant
in the others, surely does not count as being progressive. Contrasting string theory with Maxwell’s
unification of electricity and magnetism, for example, we can see that the latter was genuinely pro-
gressing and eventually successful in every dimension. It used the new and powerful concept of a field,
which made the theory simple and elegant, while at the same time giving rise to a whole set of new
phenomena that led to new predictions. ([12], p. 15)
This seems somewhat arbitrary and overly dogmatic. After pointing out several
ways in which string theory is progressive, they claim that, nonetheless, the theory
is in fact degenerative (or stagnant) overall! Yet what (non-question-begging) basis
is there for ranking the dimensions? In the final analysis, Cartwright and Frigg
defend, more or less, a traditional view of scientific method:
The question of how progressive string theory is then becomes one of truth, and this brings us back to
predictions. The more numerous, varied, precise and novel a theory’s successful predictions are, the
more confidence we can have that the theory is true, or at least approximately true (see box). That a
theory describes the world correctly wherever we have checked provides good reason to expect that it
will describe the world correctly where we have not checked. String theory’s failure to make testable
predictions therefore leaves us with little reason to believe that it gives us a true picture.
Although string theory has progressed along the dimensions of unifying and explanatory power, this in
itself is not sufficient to believe that it gives us a true picture of the world. Hence, as it stands, string
theory is not yet progressive because it has made progress only along a few of the many dimensions
that matter to a research programme’s success. (ibid.)
Cartwright and Frigg slide here from the evaluation of theories (whether it is ra-
tional to pursue them), to talk of truth. But while the various virtues exhibited by
string theory might not warrant belief in its absolute truth, they might yet warrant
an increase in the credibility of the theory. That is, they can make it perfectly ra-
tional to pursue string theory (and quantum gravity) in spite of the lack of direct
experimental support.
From the Lakatosian perspective—according to which research programmes
that are able to make novel predictions are considered progressive and those that
don’t are considered degenerative—it is not enough to fit a body of evidence, how-
ever varied and variegated that body might be. But this tags as degenerative pretty
much all quantum gravity research. Each approach we looked at above was com-
pletely detached from experiment53; any novel predictions they might make will
53Save, perhaps, Schild’s analysis of the symmetry violation by discrete spacetimes, which have
recently led on to potential phenomenological applications.
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be (most likely, forever) untestable by any direct means. Hence, if the Lakatosian
approach has this implication, then the historical record suggests that the approach
itself is at fault: it is too restrictive.
And indeed, it simply doesn’t account for the comings and goings of the ap-
proaches we looked at. Mathematical consistency (i.e. freedom from ‘bad’ diver-
gences, consistent union of general relativity and quantum theory, etc.) and the
ability to accommodate the empirical successes of the ingredient theories (general
relativity and quantum theory) were paramount. How well an approach managed
to perform with respect to these desiderata determines the strength of support. It is
also clear that often an approach is pursued simply because the tools are available
to pursue it. I have in mind here the particle physics approach to general relativ-
ity, which involved using skills that had not been previously applied in this area.
Both note too that although these considerations are used to guide the construc-
tion and evaluation of the various approaches, no one of them is definitive. Often,
even when there were severe consistency problems or even mismatches with old
evidence, a approach continued to be pursued.
5.2 Kuhn Meets Quantum Gravity
Kuhn’s model for the structure of scientific theory development is often taken to
be a more accurate description of actual events. Certain elements of his analysis
of revolutions in science seem to provide a fitting model for quantum gravity. For
instance, Kuhn writes:
Confronted with anomaly or with crisis, scientists take a different attitude toward existing paradigms,
and the nature of their research changes accordingly. The proliferation of competing articulations, the
willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy and the
debate over fundamentals, all these are symptoms of a transition from normal to extraordinary research.
([65], pp. 9091)
However, Audretsch [3] has argued that Kuhn’s approach flounders when it tries
to deal with the realities of quantum gravity.54 Firstly he sets up the problem of
quantum gravity as one involving a pair of “incompatible paradigms”, i.e. rather
than merely incommensurable paradigms which Kuhn allows. Moreover, argues
Audretsch, both of these paradigms involve an “all claim”.
I think this exposes an error in Audretsch’s formulation of the problem for
Kuhn, for neither general relativity nor quantum theory have an all-claim built
into them of necessity. And indeed there are various problems of principle—such
as the problem of explaining the final stages of black hole entropy, the small value
of the cosmological constant, the conditions at the beginning of the universe and
within black holes, and so on—which strongly suggest that neither has sufficient
warrant to make such an all-claim without some serious revisions being made.
54Diane Crane [13] conducted a sociological analysis of theoretical high-energy physics (between
1960-75), and also found it at odds with Kuhn’s model. In my view, Crane chose far too short a time
span. Had she continued, certain of her conclusions would have been altered (such as the demise of
string theory in the early 70s as a result of a failure of experimental testability).
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Audretsch also makes the claim that the paradigms of general relativity and
quantum field theory do not show any anomalies (p. 332). This is overly sim-
plistic. While there is no experimental result like the perihelion of mercury that
renders general relativity problematic, there are observable factors. For exam-
ple, the value that quantum field theory gives to the energy density of a vacuum
(the cosmological constant) is very many orders of magnitude too large. Audretsch
does mention the prediction of singularities by general relativity, but dismisses this
as a problem since they are “hidden behind horizons” (p. 333), and therefore not
empirically observable. It is certainly true that there are no ‘naked singularities’ in
general relativity, and therefore that one would not be measurable. However, the
‘cosmic censorship hypothesis’ outlawing naked singularities might not be true
in quantum gravity theories. Furthermore, it seems like a step back to positivism
to bracket worrying about a direct theoretical prediction on the grounds that we
couldn’t measure it.
One more immediate problem with the comparison of quantum gravity research
to Kuhn’s methodological model is that was nothing corresponding to paradigms
in the early work. Nobody pursued a single programme for long enough. The ap-
proaches didn’t stay fixed for long enough. There was no period of unquestioning
study and application of any of the approaches. In this very simple sense, Kuhn’s
model is inapplicable. This is a problem, for if Kuhn’s model cannot account for
80 years of scientific development then what good is it?
One possible response is that I have largely ignored the present day research
landscape, and this can be described as consisting of research traditions of a sort,
stemming from the particle physics and geometrical schools. Once one had fairly
complete frameworks for quantum gravity, in the canonical and covariant formula-
tions, then physicists quickly began to focus all their attention on one or the other,
but not both: they chose sides. As I have mentioned, and will discuss further below,
the choice was not based on empirical factors, but on their training and mentorship.
Kuhn argued that traditions of scientific research “spring” from paradigms. If we
have these schools and traditions, then perhaps we have underlying paradigms?
The problem with this view is that there is no equivalence proof connecting the
covariant and canonical formalism in the case of quantum gravity, so we would
have two separate paradigms dealing with the same subject. String theory adds
to the complications, though it might be held separate from ‘pure’ quantum grav-
ity research since it aims to be a unified theory of all four forces, rather than just
gravity.
Hence, there are some serious problems that need to be addressed by Kuhnians
if they are to capture the development of quantum gravity research. However, there
are elements of Kuhn’s philosophy that seem to fit much better, particularly those
having to do with the role of pedagogy.
Before I discuss these aspects, I should first like to say something about Cush-
ing’s view of the driving forces behind scientific change. I do this since there
are points of similarity to the episodes Cushing discusses, namely S-matrix theory
versus quantum field theory on the one hand and the Copenhagen interpretation
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versus Bohmian mechanics on the other. In the quantum gravity case we have a
split between a field theoretic approach, according to which gravity is mediated by
exchange particles just like any other force, and an approach whereby gravity is a
manifestation of curved geometry. As with Cushing’s examples (or at least as he
argues), we have underdetermination here: there is no empirical basis that could
guide selection or rejection of one over the other. And yet physicists do make
decisions about which to endorse, and they stick to their decisions.
James Cushing [15] has argued that, given the lack of an invariant methodolog-
ical principle that guides theory selection and rejection, a better explanation for
the convergence of opinion of scientists is the existence of a “pyramid structure”
in which a handful of highly creative individuals occupy the apex, serving to gen-
erate new concepts, methods, and theories (ibid., p. 3). Quantum gravity seems
to strike a blow against Cushing’s idea of a pyramid structure to science. The best
physicists all tried their hands at the theory without success, and no single theory
was pursued as a result of this. Instead there was a massive proliferation of dis-
tinct lines, not always generated by ‘great men’. Indeed, the approaches of the
great men were often ignored.
However, while Cushing’s scheme was suggested as a way of understanding
why a particular line of research is pursued, it can just as easily be utilized to show
why a particular approach or theory wasn’t pursued. The failure to produce a con-
sistent theory along some research line by so many great men (sitting at Cushing’s
apex) was a signal to the rest of the community to steer clear of quantum gravity.
To see even such a figure as Pauli both adamant about the necessity of construct-
ing a theory of quantum gravity, yet at the same time daunted by the magnitude of
the technical and conceptual hurdles would certainly put the frighteners on many
young physicists.55 This might account for some of the appearance of the history
of quantum gravity; however, I think more can be said. I mention two potential
lines of inquiry (of an &HPS nature) that can be brought to bear on the history of
quantum gravity.
6
THE RIGHT JOB FOR THE TOOLS
Very early on in the history of quantum gravity there emerged distinct paths that
were ploughed as a result of the differing backgrounds of those doing to ploughing.
With different sets of tools come different points of interest and different research
questions. For example, in the canonical (Hamiltonian) quantization approach one
is concerned with such global features as the wave-function of the universe, and
the domain space of such a wave-function. The construction and understanding
of the configuration space is a largely classical problem. By contrast, the covari-
55I use the example of Pauli since DeWitt on mentioning to Pauli that he intended to work on quantum
gravity for his PhD received the reply (delivered with a repeated nod and shake of the head): “that’s an
important problem, but it’ll take someone really smart” ([98], p. 57).
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ant approach is more ‘local’, focusing on graviton scattering and other typically
quantum field theoretic quantities (cf. [24], p. 1239). These are entirely different
ways of approaching a subject, with distinct commitments, but without empirical
distinction.
David Kaiser notes how, in his lectures at Caltech, Feynman introduced general
relativity for “physics students ... who know about quantum theory and mesons and
the fundamental particles, which were unknown in Einstein’s day” (Feynman’s
Lectures on Gravitation; cited in [59], p. 329). We have seen that the particle
physicist’s approach is conceptually very different from Einstein’s own geometri-
cal approach. Feynman, though not the first to write general relativity in this way,
sought to tailor the presentation of the theory to the needs of his students.56 The
approach was designed to mesh with the modern particle physicist’s ‘multi-field’
mindset. With the profusion of new particle types thrown up by the latest gener-
ation of particle accelerators, students were used to thinking about large numbers
of fields (associated with the particles). Feynman’s approach was to treat “the phe-
nomena of gravitation” as the addition of “another field to the pot” (ibid.); as noth-
ing special, much as many of the very earliest researchers had done. Those trained
in the ‘geometrical way’ naturally baulk at this particle physics approach. The di-
visions between the two ways of approaching gravity are felt strongly by the two
sides—one can find the genuine animosity involved in the division in today’s de-
bate over background independent versus background dependent approaches (see
[90] for a discussion of this debate). 57
There are several interesting institutional changes that enter in to this argument,
that trigger several phases of research inquiry. The earliest workers on quantum
gravity had strong backgrounds in both general relativity and quantum theory, and
had made strides in both, and often had written textbooks in both fields. But as
quantum theory became more complex, and engaged with experiments more, it
occupied more and more of physicists’ attentions. It had a larger share of mathe-
matical and conceptual problems. General relativity was, from very early on, seen
56Recall, as I said earlier, that there is not unlimited freedom in how one can do this: the principles
going into the theory, together with the observation data it would need to account for, constrain the
form of the theory very tightly indeed.
57David Kaiser has argued in a similar way that particle cosmology (roughly: general relativity
combined with elementary particle physics) emerged in the 1980s for external reasons. In particular
the cold war bubble burst resulting in a cessation of particle physics funding opportunities. The upshot
of this is that there are a bunch of physicists who need to get their funding from somewhere.58 This
predicament forces the ploughing of new research avenues. In this case the hybridization of cosmology
and particle physics. The joining of these subjects is not entirely accidental: cosmology involves (in
certain areas) extreme high-energy phenomena, of just the kind that could function as a laboratory for
particle physicists!59 Moreover, the two fields had some history together: the union is not entirely
novel. However, it was certainly professionalized in the period Kaiser studies. Background conditions
(external factors) can, then, quite clearly be seen to impact institutions which in turn impact scientific
thought. I mention this case study since it impacts directly on the development of quantum gravity.
Cosmological scenarios could be exploited to generate phenomenology for quantum gravity theorists.
Not only this, the interaction between particle physics and cosmology resulted in the training of a
generation of new scientists with strong skills in both quantum field theory and general relativity.
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to be essentially finished. Hence, the physicists’ interests and toolkits shifted more
and more into quantum theory, and this shift can be seen in the evolution of ap-
proaches to the quantum gravity problem. It wasn’t really until John Wheeler and
Peter Bergmann began working on quantum gravity in the 1950s, and gathered
high quality students around themselves that the geometrical approaches began to
make their mark once again. But by this stage there were very strong disciplinary
splits, marked out by the existence of distinctive ‘schools’.
Of course, as I said above, though these institutional factors contribute a great
deal to the nature of the research that is done in quantum gravity, and can go
a long way in explaining why certain physicists hold some particular approach,
there is not much latitude in the possibilities that theories can take. The available
tools are one constraint among many others. I finish by saying something about
the notion of constraints, and the role they play in establishing scientific beliefs,
and accounting for changes in science. I am particularly concerned with finding
some kind of constraint that can play a role functionally similar to that played by
experiments in guiding theoretical developments.
7
CONVERGENCE AND CONSTRAINTS
Ian Hacking notes that the convergence on some feature or result (of a theory) can
prove very convincing (in evaluative terms) in cases where the convergence comes
about through quite different instruments and experiments, using quite distinct
physical principles:
we are convinced because instruments using entirely different physical principles lead us to observe
pretty much the same structures in the same specimen. ([49], p. 209)
If we keep finding some similar behaviour in a wide variety of conditions, then we
are prone to believe that the behaviour is a universal feature, not some artefact of
a model or experiment. Certain results crop up in multiple formalisms and in the
context of quite distinct investigations in quantum gravity research. For example,
the divergences, or in later work, the existence of quantum geometry.
This is especially important in the absence of experiments. One can usefully
view this through the lens of Peter Galison’s notion of “constraints” [41]. Con-
straints are very much the life-blood of science. They minimize the latitude one
has in theory construction. The satisfaction constraints can in itself act as an eval-
uative measure. In the absence of experiments and observation, new kinds of con-
straints must come to the fore, to guide theorizing.60 The black hole entropy value
I mentioned earlier functions, in some sense, as a constraint almost (but not quite)
60The classic tests of GR functioned as constraints on the early approaches in a more standard way.
What is more interesting is where we have approaches that match up on all pre-existing knowledge,
and don’t make any novel testable predictions either.
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like an experimental constraint. The new approaches are tested against this con-
straint. It thus provides new material for constructing theories, or working out the
possibilities of old theories. Renormalizability too acted as a crucial constraint in
the post-WWII years. Weinberg describes the importance of this constraint:
[I]t seemed to me to be a wonderful thing that very few quantum field theories are renormalizable.
Limitations of this sort are, after all, what we most want; not mathematical methods which can make
sense out of an infinite variety of physically irrelevant theories, but methods which carry constraints,
because these constraints may point the way towards the one true theory. In particular, I was very
impressed by the fact that [QED] could in a sense be derived from symmetry principles and the con-
straint of renormalizability; the only Lorentz invariant and gauge invariant renormalizable Lagrangian
for photons and electrons is precisely the original Dirac Lagrangian. ([104], p. 1213; cited in [41], p.
22)
The original perturbative approach was rejected because it conflicted with this
constraint. By contrast, string theory was given credence because it offered the
prospect of a finite theory. However, it was then found to violate the constraint
that there be no quantum anomalies in the theory (i.e. symmetries that are in
the classical theory but broken at the quantum level). The subsequent evasion of
this constraint provided almost as significant a degree of motivation for renewed
interest in the theory as a successful experiment.
However, as with experiments, we shouldn’t place too much weight on them:
they are rarely decisive. As I mentioned in the string theory case; these constraints
can lead one to drop a theory prematurely, only to be found at a later date to sat-
isfy it. I mentioned earlier in fn.9 that the lessons of the Bohr-Rosenfeld analysis
of measurability of the electromagnetic field were taken to transfer over to the
gravitational case (yet another example of the analogical reasoning so prevalent in
quantum gravity research).61 The idea was that the gravitational field would nec-
essarily have to be quantized if it were coupled to another quantized field, or to
quantized matter. This belief spurred on physicists in the early days. However, in
the 1957 Chapel Hill conference (On the Role of Gravitation in Physics), Rosen-
feld argues that the analysis he performed with Bohr does not translate into the
gravitational case. The crucial dis-analogy is that one cannot (even theoretically)
find a measuring instrument that would not generate perturbations in the measure-
ment result: this is due to the equivalence principle. In the electromagnetic case
the fact that there are both positive and negative charges allows one to control the
perturbations. The electromagnetic field can be shielded.
This supposed necessity (suggested by the thought experiment) previously func-
tioned as a constraint on quantum gravitational theorizing. However, John Wheeler
was willing to suggest (following Rosenfeld’s remarks) that perhaps the measure-
ment problem for quantum gravity could be ignored for the present and than one
place more emphasis on “the organic unity of nature” as a key constraint ([105], p.
83). Hence, though the development of theory demands constraints to guide it at
any one time; the constraints it makes use of don’t have to be constant.
61Note that such analogies can themselves be interpreted as constraints, for one is essentially making
a claim that two systems are sufficiently similar so that the (well-known) constraints that apply to one
will most likely apply to the other.
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In the very earliest approaches, there was no quantum field theory available, so
what would become an important constraint (renormalizability) was absent. Once
QED was constructed, however, one could get a handle on computable aspects
of quantum gravity, and compare them to what had been done in QED. Rosen-
feld’s computation of the self-energy of the graviton was such an example. The
development of renormalisability led to an easily applicable criterion to decide
whether a theory was worth pursuing. Interestingly, the constraint of renormaliz-
ability played a lesser role once the tools of renormalization group theory had been
assimilated.
General invariance became a constraint itself. Other important constraints in-
clude unitarity (probability conservation), Lorentz invariance, and causality. These
combined in an interesting way (with known resonance data from particle collision
experiments) to lead to string theory in the late 1960s. Taken together, these prin-
ciples can home in on a very small number of possible candidate theories. Indeed,
for a long time it was believed that they could work in tandem to produce a unique
theory, though this view is less popular today. Whether the constraints can force
uniqueness or not, it is true that they reduce the freedom one has in theory con-
struction, and this is crucial, for without them one would have infinite freedom! A
new field known as quantum gravity phenomenology, currently in the early stages,
is developing in order to provide additional data to further constraint the possible
theories of quantum gravity.
The notion of constraints seems to offer some promise in exposing the innards
of the black box I began with, in a way that might be conducive to philosophers.
The constraints are at work on both constructive and evaluative levels. The interest
to sociologists enters through the fact that different communities are determined by
their different trainings (with different toolkits), and this difference spills over into
a difference over what constraints ought to be respected (renormalizability versus
general invariance, for example). Only a close investigation of the historical details
can reveal which constraints guided some particular theory choice. The constraints
will often be sociological as well as mathematical and empirical.
8
CONCLUSION
Quantum gravity research constitutes an ideal and novel historical episode that
should appeal to historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science alike. The
absence of possible experiments and experimental anomalies that usually drive the
development of the field expose an entirely different set of inner workings than
we are used to seeing in science. One can see how a range of virtues (such as
unification, beauty, and so on) beyond ‘the usual suspects’ can guide both the
construction and justification of theories. One also sees the strong role played by
analogies, which continued to be pursued despite the knowledge that the analogy
was far from perfect. Methodologically, what the development of quantum gravity
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reveals is that what is deemed appropriate will depend upon what constraints are
available at the time, and this is prone to changes of a great variety of sorts.
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